3. Language Origin
Philosophical Functionalism and our objections to it
Philosophical Functionalism
In more recent years, along with the development of artificial intelligence, computer languages, and cognitive science, a new theory of philosophy/ psychology, called Functionalism, has been proposed. The philosophers Putnam and Fodor were prominent in the founding of this movement but it
now seems as though both may have given it up. Dennett and particularly Chalmers are its most vocal advocates today.
Like Behaviourism, Functionalism is a Materialism. Even when Function- alists do allow for mind and consciousness, as does Chalmers, for example, they consider mind and consciousness in physical terms. With their focus on behaviour and brain, and on inanimate machine functions (this is what is new), the Functionalists are the natural successors to the Behaviourists. Thus, when we hear Chalmers (1996) say, ‘The very fact that [conscious] experience can be coherently subtracted from any causal account implies that [conscious] experience is superfluous in the explanation of behaviour’ (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 158–9), we know we have not come far from Skinner’s quintessential assertion, noted a few sections before.
Functionalism is foundational for those cognitive sciences that would abstract from details of physical implementation in order to seek principles common to all intelligent processing devices (Dennett, 1978; Fodor, 1980; Dretske, 1981). So long as the function of a calculator is identical to the function of a human being doing arithmetic, in that they have the same input and output relations, the Functionalist has a basis for asserting that the calculator can have similar mental states and experiences as does the human. It is in identity of functions, same input (16 ´ 3) and same output (48), that the state of the calculator can be regarded as equivalent to the mental state of a human, with both providing the same output in response to the same input. Because of this functional equality, a Functionalist like Chalmers is willing to grant the attributes of ‘mental’ and ‘mind’ to the calculator.
The language philosopher Searle (1997) sharply criticized this position of Chalmers, after which Chalmers modified his assertion about inanimate objects having experiences. He now says that he is not firmly committed to that position and that ‘I merely explore it and remain agnostic’ (Chalmers, 1997, p. 165). But how can anyone seriously consider that inanimate objects have conscious experiences? To admit to being ‘agnostic’ on such an issue is like being agnostic on the notion that dogs can design computers. Sure, it is possible, but how probable?
Objections to Philosophical Functionalism
Without mind and consciousness, the Functionalists cannot deal with cer- tain problems (Shoemaker, 1975; Block, 1978; Lewis, 1980). The same sort of objections that can be raised with regard to Functionalism can also be applied to Behaviourism (Steinberg et al., 2001).
1. Insincerity and Lying. How do we explain what it means to be insincere or lie without resorting to a conscious intention in the mind of the speaker who made the promise? Because Functionalist theory has only one level
of analysis, the physical, there can be no such thing as ‘insincerity’ or ‘lying’. We cannot even meaningfully ask if a person is lying. With every- thing physical and functional there is no place for morality or ethics. Responsibility for actions is meaningless to contemplate. Any system of law, and the judicial system, is rendered virtually meaningless. Certainly it makes no sense to accuse a computer of lying!
2. Dreams and Speech. How, based on a subjective experience such as a dream, can a person say and do things related to that dream? How can a Func- tionalist theory explain this? Again two levels, physical and mental, are necessary for an adequate explanation. How can a computer have dreams?
3. Toothache and Dentist. Why does a person who experiences the pain of a toothache speak about pain and then go to the dentist’s surgery for treatment. How believable is it that a computing device can experience anything?
This is precisely the point that Maloney (1987) raises. (See Antony, 1994, for other objections.) As Maloney puts it, the whole theory of Functionalism is based on the premise that it is possible for the mind to be realized in something outside of the brain. This premise is dramatized by supposing, for example, that it is possible that carbon-free Martians have minds but lack brains. But what justifies the crucial assumption of the real possibility of brainless, silicone Martian minds? It is no answer to reply that anything imaginable is possible. For in that case, one can easily imagine the opposite,
i.e. that it is necessary that minds be associated with brains. Maloney argues that until the Functionalist can ‘certify’ (bring evidence to bear on) the possibility of a mind without a brain, the Functionalist philosophy itself can only be regarded as a mere possibility. Until then, Functionalism must remain in the realm of science fiction.